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Abstract
We argue that a recently appointed operations manager deploys a higher variability inventory policy than a high-
tenure operations manager does. This contention is supported by the idea that the former manager determines the
production schedule by focusing on the current-period demand for information, while the latter also incorporates her
expectations over future demand shocks. A second theoretical outcome of this study is that the variability of inventory
and of the number of firm’s employees are positively correlated, especially in firms with a recently appointed
operational manager. Such managers use cojointly inventory and temporary workers to buffer demand shocks more
often than high-tenure managers. Empirical support for these propositions was gathered from two databases of Spanish
manufacturing firms.
r 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The determinants of firms’ inventory policy
have been thoroughly studied in operations
management. Models addressing such issue have
found that managers hold inventories either to
minimize firms’ total cost of operations under
uncertainty conditions (Blinder and Maccini,
1991) or as a basic element of firms’ overall
strategy (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1989). A third
stream of research has investigated the relation-
ship between layoffs and inventory variations
(Haltiwanger and Maccini, 1988, 1994). In parti-
cular, these authors analyze how temporary work-
ers can serve as a buffer mechanism, quite similar
to inventories, to smooth production.
Our paper departs from previous studies in its
focus of analysis, which shifts from the down-
stream echelons of the chain of command (work-
ers) to the upstream level (operations managers
(OMs). A number of papers study the role of OMs,
such as Oakland and Sohal (1989) and D’Netto
et al. (1998). However, none of such investigations
focus on the eventual influence of OMs over the
variability of the firm’s inventory policy. Specifi-
cally, we contend that the tenure of OMs within
the firm exerts a lasting influence on the design of
inventory policy. We argue that low-tenure OMs
act in a short-sighted way, and define an inventory
policy which is basically contingent on current-
period demand shocks. Conversely, high-tenure
OMs (not recently appointed) incorporate their
expectations over future demand shocks in the
way they define the firm’s inventory policy. This
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feature, in turn, smoothes the changes in the
inventory level.
The second point of the paper draws on
Haltiwanger and Maccini (1990). These authors
show the existence of a double mechanism to
buffer demand shocks: inventories and temporary
worker layoffs. Our purpose is to study whether
the tenure of an OM in the firm exerts an influence
on the way in which these two mechanisms are
used. We argue that low-tenure managers have a
short-time perspective that makes them prefer
temporary workers (the ones to buffer demand
shocks) to permanent ones, as these are more
expensive in the short term. Thus, decisions of
recently appointed managers about inventory level
and the number of employees will show preference
to use cojointly both mechanisms to buffer
demand shocks more often than high-tenure
managers would do.
Empirical evidence that supports these ideas has
been gathered from a database of Spanish firms.
This paper consists of three more sections. The
second one explains the theoretical arguments. In
the third section we conduct the empirical analysis.
Lastly, the fourth one outlines our concluding
remarks.
2. Theoretical framework
The tenure of a manager in the firm influences
her decisions. On the one hand, low-tenure
managers focus on short-term results in order to
prove themselves and convince the owners that
their skills are high. On the other hand, a high-
tenure manager, in principle, bears less pressure to
achieve positive short-term results and might be
willing to undertake long-term planning. Palley
(1997) shows that less stable managers act in a
myopic way and select short-term investment
projects. Drawing on the same logic, we expect
that high-tenure OMs investment decisions on
inventories will be less myopic than those of low-
tenure OMs. High-tenure OMs, in contrast to
recently appointed ones, will design the firm’s
inventory policy based not only on current
demand shocks, but also on their expectations of
future demand shocks. As a consequence of that,
high-tenure OMs will assess the firm’s optimal
inventory level more accurately and will attempt to
adjust inventories to that level in every period.1
The cost of not adjusting to this level is twofold:
Small shocks imply higher inventory costs, larger
shocks imply higher probability of shortage in the
future. A recently appointed OM will behave
differently, putting more weight on current de-
mand shocks. Her limited experience within the
firm hinders good prediction making on future
demand. From that manager’s point of view,
future shocks will basically be unexpected, and
this will generate more inventory volatility. In
short:
Hypothesis 1. Firm’s inventory variability is lower
with a high-tenure OM than with a recently
appointed OM.
A second question, which was addressed by
Haltiwanger and Maccini (1990), is the existence
of different mechanisms to smooth demand
shocks. Temporary worker layoffs for negative
demand shocks or temporary worker hiring for
positive ones, can be used as a complementary
buffer mechanism of inventories as these authors
point out. In that case a positive correlation
between the variations of both variables is
expected.
Hypothesis 2. [Haltiwanger and Maccini] Firms
that show a high turnover in their employees also
show a higher inventory variability than the
average firm of the corresponding sector.
Connected with the previous statement, we can
argue over the influence of the tenure of an OM in
the way these mechanisms to buffer demand
shocks are used. Alfaro and Trib !o (2001) show
that the short-term focus of low-tenure managers
leads them to hire temporary workers instead of
permanent ones. The basic argument is that
temporary workers are less expensive in the short
term since the comparative advantage of the latter
is in the long term, linked to increases in their
productivity. Low-tenure managers are, however,
only interested in the near future. In this situation,
if a manager decides the inventory policy and the
1Stock-adjustment model (Lovell, 1961).
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labor policy, the lower her tenure is, the more
complementary the labor and inventory policy
become. The reason is that the labor-smoothing
channel is based on temporary workers (Halti-
wanger and Maccini, 1990), precisely those work-
ers whom a low-tenure manager is biased to hire.
This defines our last hypothesis to contrast:
Hypothesis 3. Low-tenure OMs use inventories
and temporary workers in a more complementary
way than high-tenure managers do.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data and variable definition
We gathered data from two complementary
databases to test for our hypotheses. The DUNS
50,000 database provides information on the
managerial structure of the 50,000 more important
Spanish manufacturing firms. This database, thus,
becomes instrumental to determine the turnover of
OMs. Unfortunately, Spanish firms are not
obliged to report the name of the OM, and this
has decreased significantly the number of firms
under investigation. The second database, SABE,
is the largest database for Spanish firms. It
provides accounting and financial information
for more than 200,000 firms.
Our study has focused on four sectors: the car
industry (SIC 37), machinery (SIC 35), basic textile
(SIC 22), and apparel industry (SIC 23). We have
chosen them because they are intensive in inven-
tory investments and they are especially relevant
for the Spanish economy.2 By filtering3 and cross-
referencing the data in DUNS and SABE, we have
obtained an incomplete panel data of 540 firms
with 3161 observations for the period 1994–1998.
Table 1 summarizes the variables we use in our
empirical investigation:
CHANINV pinpoints observations where the
relative changes of inventories are significant:
higher than the average of the sector. We use this
threshold criterion in all variables. We characterize
OMs tenure with two variables, which are
inversely related: CHANGE and TENURE. We
take as high tenure those OM with at least 2 years
within the firm and that will not be replaced in the
next year.4 This is a way to capture some stability
in the contract of these managers. On the contrary,
Table 1
Variable definition
CHANINV Equates to 1 (0) if the variation rate of firm’s inventories is higher (lower), in absolute value, than the mean rate of
the sector between period t and period t þ 1
CHANGE Equates to 1 (0) if the OM has (not) changed from period t  1 to period t
TENURE Equates to 1 if the OM has not been replaced in period t; and it will not be replaced in the next period. Also, its
value is zero when the OM has been replaced
CHANGEMP Equates to 1(0) if the variation rate of firm’s employees is higher (lower), in absolute value, than the mean rate of
the sector between period t  1 and t
SIZE Equates to 1 (0) when the number of a firm’s employees is higher (lower) than 100
CHANSALES Equates to 1 (0) if the rate increase of firm’s sales is higher (lower) than the mean rate of the sector between period
t  1 and period t
RST This ratio is defined as short-term debt divided by total debt
SECTOR Equates to 1 if the firm belongs to ‘‘textile’’ sectors (SIC 22 and 23), and zero if it belongs to the other sectors
FINDIS Equates to 1(0) if the ratio of financial expenses to the EBITDA moves from a value higher than 2 at the
beginning of the year to a value lower than 1 at the end
2Official statistics given by the Spanish Department of
Industry (http://www.ine.es/inebase/cgi/um), show that for the
year 2000 the combined net sales of these four sectors
represented 30% of the GDP.
3We reject firms with non-sense values, such as employ-
mento0, internal resourceso0, debto0, stockso0, financial
expenditureso0.
4More demanding criteria would have reduced the variability
of this variable beyond a level that would have prevented to
conduct conditional logit estimations.
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a low-tenure manager is a recently appointed OM.
The characterization of significant variations in
employment and sales is made with the CHAN-
GEMP and CHANSALES variables, respectively.
We control for size effects with the SIZE variable,
where 100 is the threshold value, which separates
big and small firms (this is the normal criteria used
by Spanish institutions). Variable RST is a
measure of the firm’s financial constraints, which
are quite relevant to shape changes in the firms
(Kashyap et al., 1994). This variable complements
FINDIS, which accounts for situations of financial
distress.5 Finally, we use SECTOR as a sector
dummy variable.
3.2. Methods and results
To test the previous hypotheses we conduct logit
estimations6 over the dichotomic variable CHA-
NINV that measures the degree of the firm’s
inventory variability. The panel structure of the
data allows controlling for the existence of
individual effects, as well as to focus on the
variations of each particular firm’s inventory level
once its OM has been removed. The econometric








þ b3CHANSALESit þ b4SIZEitþ1
þ b5RSTitþ1 þ b6SECTORitþ1
þ b7FINDISitþ1 þ ctþ1 þ ui þ eitþ1: ð1Þ
The variable CHANGE is lagged one period
because an OM appointed at the end of period t
might begin her activity in period t þ 1 and not in
period t: As this information is not available, the
easy way to avoid this problem is to lag this
variable by one period. In order to test Hypothesis
2, we introduce CHANGEMP in the specification
with one-period lag as an instrument, because this
hypothesis predicts an endogenous relationship
between both variables. Finally, some control
variables are incorporated. First, CHANSALES
accounts for the existence of demand shocks that
generate big variations in the firm’s sales. This
variable is also lagged one period to reduce
eventual endogeneity problems. Note that inven-
tories are the residual after production and sales;
thus, there is a contemporaneous connection
between CHANINV and CHANSALES. The
natural instrument to use in these situations is
the one-period lagged variable. We also introduce
variables, to control for size effects (SIZE), for
eventual cash shortages due to the existence of
short-term debt (RST), for sectorial effects (SEC-
TOR) and for the existence of situations of
financial distress (FINDIS). With this last vari-
able, we try to extract the effect of a reorganiza-
tion process in a financially distressed firm that
could eventually lead to the OM be removed as
well as to a liquidation of assets like inventories.
Table 2 shows the results of estimating Eq. (1).
The first two columns correspond to simple
cross-section logit estimations, whereas column 3
shows the results of the conditional logit estima-
tion. All the estimations comply with the Wald test
of overall significativity. However, the most
relevant results are those of the conditional logit
estimation because the Hausman Test rejects the
null hypothesis of non-existence of individual
effects (ui ¼ 0) at a 99% confidence level. Thus,
column 3 shows consistent estimates and we take
those results as the most relevant. However, we
should be aware that the presence of variables with
potential endogeneity problems could distort the
results, especially in the conditional logit estima-
tions. In that case a strict exogeneity in the
independent variables is required. In the next
section, we address this issue by conducting a
robust analysis with multinomial logit estimations.
Additionally, we restrict the conditional logit
estimations to the TENURE variable. The reason
not to use CHANGE as the main independent
variable is that an endogeneity problem with
CHANINV may emerge. An owner may replace
the OM under those circumstances that also gene-
rate a high inventory variation (i.e. organizational
5We adopt the criterion of Asquith et al. (1994) to define this
kind of situations.
6We focus on logit estimations because conditional logit
estimation allows controlling for individual effects.
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restructuring).7 With TENURE, the previous
problem is less acute since this variable is defined
in terms of the number of periods an OM is in
charge of firm inventory policy.
Table 2 shows that the CHANGE variable is
both positive and significant, at a 95% confidence
level, whereas the TENURE variable is negative
and significant at a 95% level in both estimations.
Thus, consistently with Hypothesis 1, the higher
the tenure of an OM, the lower the relative change
of the firm’s inventory with respect to the average
of the sector. Concerning CHANGEMP, the
estimation shows that significant changes in the
number of employees have a positive impact on
the probability of significant changes in the firm’s
inventories. However, this is only weakly signifi-
cant (90%) in the conditional logit estimation. We
are going to precise this outcome in the next
section by conducting a robust analysis with
multinomial logit estimations.
Our control variables show, first, contradictory
results between the normal and the conditional
logits estimations for the CHANSALES variable.
Potential endogeneity problems may also appear
with this variable, and we postpone any definitive
conclusion until the next section where we tackle
these issues. Second, the remaining variables seem
not to exert a significant impact on the relative
variations of a firm’s inventory level.
3.2.2. Endogeneity problems. Multinomial logit
In the previous section we have argued that
there may be some endogenous relationships
between CHANINV and the independent vari-
ables CHANGE, CHANGEMP and CHAN-
SALES. To manage this problem, we conduct
three different multinomial logit estimations. With
the first one, we attempt to compute the condi-
tional probability of CHANINV=1 contingent on
CHANGE=1, in one case, and CHANGE=0 in
the other. The econometric strategy we follow
begins with the estimation of the joint probabilities
of CHANINV and CHANGE. This is made by
conducting a multinomial logit estimation with a
dependent variable, V ; that adopts four values
contingent on the different combinations of the
latter variables:
0 when CHANINV ¼ 0 and CHANGE ¼ 0;
1 when CHANINV ¼ 0 and CHANGE ¼ 1;
2 when CHANINV ¼ 1 and CHANGE ¼ 0
and
3 when CHANINV ¼ 1 and CHANGE ¼ 1:
Table 2
Logit estimation of CHANINV
Cross-section estimationa Cross-section estimationa Fixed-effect estimationa
CHANGE 0.592** (2.012)
TENURE 594** (2.012) 2.208** (2.060)
CHANGEMP 0.520*** (2.759) 0.660***(3.254) 0.858*(1.519)
CHANSALES 0.472*** (2.445) 0.393** (1.910) 0.569* (1.782)
SIZE 0.508*** (2.624) 0.507*** (2.386) 0.178 (0.130)
RST 0.543 (0.897) 0.334 (0.506) 0.616 (0.284)
SECTORb 0.582*** (3.050) 0.623*** (3.019)
FINDIS 0.653 (1.228) 0.371 (0.687) 1.635 (1.453)
Constant 2.477*** (4.157) 1.267** (1.924)
Number of observations 896 795 231
Wald Test 42.91 (0.000) 34.97 (0.000) 15.28 (0.018)
Pseudo R2 4.47 4.37 9.20
Hausman Test 73.89 (0.000)
a t-statistics in parenthesis. Includes time dummy variables. *90% signif. **95% signif. ***99% signif.
bThis variable is dropped in the conditional logit estimation since there is no within group variability.
7We gratefully acknowledge this comment to one of the
referees.
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To be consistent with the univariate logit analysis,
the specification adopted takes as independent
variables, apart from CHANGE, those others
from the univariate specification defined in Eq. (1).
As a result, four different joint probabilities are
obtained: changes in employees and inventories
(V ¼ 3), changes in inventories but not in employ-
ees (V ¼ 2), changes in the number of employees
but not in inventories (V ¼ 1), and no significant
changes in the number of employees, nor in the
inventory level (V ¼ 0). Finally, we can compute
with these joint probabilities, the conditional
probabilities of CHANINV=1 conditioned on
CHANGE=1 in one case, or on CHANGE=0 in
the other.8 It is important to note that estimating
the joint probability takes care of the possible
endogeneity problems of the two variables. This
makes the comparison of the conditional prob-
abilities a reliable measure of the impact of
CHANGE in the variation of firm’s inventory
once possible endogeneity problems are controlled
for. An equivalent strategy is used for the analysis
of CHANINV and CHANGEMP in the second
multinomial logit estimation and similarly for
CHANINV and CHANSALES in the third one.
The formal procedure is just to substitute the
CHANGE variable in all the previous arguments
by CHANGEMP in the former case, and by
CHANSALES in the latter. The results obtained
are reported in Table 4.
Table 3 shows three different results. First, the
probability to find a significant variation rate of
firm’s inventories is higher (99%) when a recently
appointed OM is in charge. This confirms in a
more robust way Hypothesis 1. Second, there is a
significantly (99%) superior probability to find a
firm’s inventory variation rate higher than the
average of the sector in those firms that exhibit a
significant change in the number of their employ-
ees. This result concurs with Haltiwanger and
Maccini’s contention. Finally, a higher inventory
variation is obtained after a period of a significant
sales increase.
To address Hypothesis 3, we pursue the same
strategy as that described in the previous multi-
nomial logit estimation concerning CHANINV
and CHANGEMP variables but the four joint
probabilities fW ¼ 0; W ¼ 1; W ¼ 2; W ¼ 3g9
are computed contingent on the TENURE vari-
able. In so doing we are able to compare, for high-
tenure and low-tenure OMs, the conditional
probability of a significant inventory variation
rate (CHANINV=1) conditioned on the existence








CHANGE=1 24.163 10.785 3914
CHANGE=0 18.484 (0.000)
CHANGEMP=1 26.228 24.899 1640
CHANGEMP=0 15.169 (0.000)
CHANSALES=1 28.165 19.321 1640
CHANSALES=0 20.238 (0.000)
a In percentage (%).





9W ¼ 0 when CHANINV=0 and CHANGEMP=0; W ¼ 1
when CHANINV=0 and CHANGEMP=1; W ¼ 2 when
CHANINV=1 and CHANGEMP=0 and W ¼ 3 when
CHANINV=1 and CHANGEMP=1.
J.A. Alfaro, J.A. Trib !o / Int. J. Production Economics 81–82 (2003) 51–5856
Interestingly enough, we obtain that a low-
tenure OM buffers demand shocks making use of
both mechanisms (inventories and workers) in a
more complementary way than a high-tenure OM
does. Note that the probability to find a significant
inventory variation rate conditional on a signifi-
cant employees variation rate is superior (at a 99%
confidence level) in case that a low-tenure OM is in
charge than when a high-tenure OM is (39.115%
versus 24.654%). This result is reversed when there
has not been a significant variation rate in the
number of employees (CHANGEMP=0). In this
situation the previous conditional probability is
higher for the case of a high-tenure OM. As a
synthesis, the impact of employee variation rate on
the probability of finding an inventory variation
rate higher than the average of the sector is
superior for low-tenure OMs than for high-tenure
ones. We report, for completeness, the correlation
between dichotomic variables, {CHANINV and
CHANGEMP}: 27.91% for low-tenure OM, and
8.67% for high-tenure OM. Thus, a low-tenure
OM uses both mechanisms (inventories and
temporary employees) as complementary channels
to accommodate to demand shocks, while a high-
tenure OM uses them more independently. This
conforms to Hypothesis 3.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown that the tenure of
OMs is a relevant characteristic to determine a
firm’s inventory variability as well as the connec-
tion between this variability and that of the
number of employees. We have argued that a
recently appointed OM takes decisions focusing on
a shorter temporal horizon than a high-tenure OM
does, because the former has to comply with some
short-term objectives to ensure her continuity
within the firm. This feature generates, among
other things, that low-tenure managers put the
weight to define the firm’s inventory policy mainly
on current-period demand shocks, a feature that
hinders a possible inter-temporal smoothing of the
effects of demand shocks. This lack of perspective
by this OM generates a higher inventory varia-
bility in comparison with that defined by high-
tenure OM. A second result draws on the work of
Haltiwanger and Maccini (1990), regarding the
existence of a positive correlation between the
firm’s inventory variability and that of the firm’s
employee number. We argue that this should be
especially observed in firms with a low-tenure OM.
Our empirical test is based on a sample of
Spanish manufacturing firms. It supports for our
theoretical assertions. First, firms with a high-
tenure OM show lower inventory variability than
those others with a recently appointed OM.
Second, firms reporting high employee variation
rate also show higher inventory variability than
the average firm in their industry. Third, firms with
a recently appointed OM, use inventories and
worker layoffs in a more complementary way than
firms with a high-tenure OM, that use both
mechanisms more independently.
Our results suggest some further lines where
work should be done. First, to investigate the
Table 4






T-test of meansb Number of
observations
CHANGEMP=1 24.654 39.115 20.055 (0.000) 1640
CHANGEMP=0 15.631 9.856 5.249 (0.000)
T-test of meansb 21.555 (0.000) 23.610 (0.000)
Number of observations 1474 166
aIn percentage (%).
bT-test of the mean differences.
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influence of OM contract characteristics, other
than the length, in the definition of the firm’s
inventory policy. We believe that the bonus of the
OM compensation scheme is also relevant to
explain the firm’s inventory changes. Second, the
use of more precise indicators of inventory
variations should be pursued in order to check
the robustness of our results. Third, a dynamic
extension of the model (e.g., by considering
contract renegotiation) might help in a further
understanding of the firms’ inventory policy.
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